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Abstract
We show that typical tests of whether forecasters herd will falsely indicate herding
behaviour for a variety of types of behaviour and forecasting environments that give
rise to disagreement amongst forecasters. We establish that forecasters will appear to
herd if di¤erences between them reect noise as opposed to private information, or if
they arise from informational rigidities. Noise can have a behavioural interpretation,
and if so will depend on the behavioural model under consideration. An application of
the herding tests to US quarterly survey forecasts of ination and output growth data
1981-2013 does not support herding behaviour.
JEL Classication: E37.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The recent literature suggests that forecasters may have incentives other than to produce
the most accurate forecast possible. That is, the traditional assumption that the reported
forecast has the minimum expected squared forecast error neglects other motivations that
may also a¤ect the forecasterspayo¤s. As noted by Lamont (2002), for example, forecasters
may set their forecasts to optimize prots or wages, credibility, shock value, marketability,
political power... (see Laster et al. (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006), inter alia).
Some of the empirical literature on assessing the inuence of reputation and related factors
on the determination of agentsforecasts rests on the notion of herding - whether forecasters
put undue weight on the views of others when they produce their forecasts, and either move
their forecasts towards, or away from the consensus view, in a way which is detrimental to
forecast accuracy.
A review of the recent macro-forecasting literature suggests that herding behaviour (in-
cluding anti-herding behaviour1) is commonplace: see Table 1. At the same time, in recent
years there has been much innovative work on expectations formation, and various theories
of forecaster behaviour have been proposed to explain the observed heterogeneity in ex-
pectations, which of course is not consistent with the full-information rational expectations
(FIRE) hypothesis, in which there is no place for disagreement amongst forecasters.
The question we ask is whether forecasters predominantly herd (or anti-herd) or whether
instead the positive results from testing for herding in the literature are due to other (non-
herding) types of behaviour which falsely show up as herding. Hence we investigate the
properties of tests of herding in the presence of some of the (non-herding) forecaster behav-
iours which have been proposed in the recent literature. The tests we consider are essentially
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reduced form, in that they are not linked to specic types of behaviour, but are formulated
such that the null of no (anti-)herding is a simple exclusion restriction in a regression. The
tests we analyze are based on or adapt extant approaches to testing forecaster herding.
It is clear that testing for herding behaviour is unlikely to be straightforward, and might
falsely signal herding. Individualsforecasts will tend to cluster together for reasons other
than herding, including for example a sharing of common information about the likely future
evolution of the variable of interest. We show that other forms of forecasters behaviour will
also (falsely) indicate herding.
We begin with a simple framework which sets out the characteristics of forecaster behav-
iour which determine the outcomes of the tests of forecasting we consider. We then describe
some of the leading theory models in the recent literature which give rise to disagreement
among forecasters, and show how these models relate to the simple framework. Hence we
are able to distill the various theories of behaviour into a small number of characteristics
which determine the outcome of the tests of herding. This means that the herding-detection
implications of any new theories that might be proposed can be deduced from this frame-
work. The theory models of forecaster behaviour include informational rigidities, agents with
heterogeneous degrees of asymmetry of their loss functions, agents di¤ering in terms of their
priors or long-term expectations, in terms of their forecasting models, and in terms of their
signals and interpretation of those signals.
The key aspects or characteristics which determine the herding test outcomes are whether
forecaster disagreement reects private information, or noise, and whether the history of
the variable is observed or remains unobserved and latent. Hence our simple model features
private information and noise or idiosyncratic errors. None of the forecasters pay attention to
the views of others, so there is no herding. Noise is not intended to simply signify reporting
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error. It is a source of forecast dispersion which has a behavioural interpretation within the
context of the model of expectations formation under consideration. The term noise is a
catch-all for di¤erences between forecasters which are unrelated to private information, and
consequently the individual forecast errors and forecasts are correlated for forecasts which
contain noise components, but not for individual forecasts driven by private information.
Private information is assumed to be handled rationally in that forecast errors and forecasts
are not correlated for forecasts embedding private information. One might wonder whether
macro-forecasters are privy to useful information not available to others, and this suggests
that there is a prima facie case that di¤erences between macro-forecasters reect what we
term noise, and so are likely to falsely indicate herding. Regardless of ones view on this,
the simple model captures the essential features of the forecasting environment in terms of
predicting when the herding tests will reject the no-herding null.
We then illustrate our ndings with the US Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)
output growth and ination forecasts. We deduce from the pattern of testing results we
obtain that there is little evidence of concerted (anti-)herding behaviour. The forecasting
environment appears to be characterized by agents whose forecasts primarily di¤er because
of idiosyncratic factors, or because of private information with the past values of the variables
being forecasting remaining unobserved. We are unable to distinguish between the di¤erent
theories of forecaster behaviour, as many give rise to the same underlying factors which
determine herding test outcomes. However choosing between the di¤erent theories is not our
purpose: many of the papers extolling the di¤erent forms of behaviour assess the evidence for
the superiority of their ideas (see, e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015), Giacomini
et al. (2015)).
Some of the recent papers focus on the implications for (cross-section) aggregate mea-
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sures, for example, the responses of mean errors and forecaster dispersion to shocks. In part
this is necessary in that some of the implications of the theories are emergent properties in
that they are only apparent at the aggregate level.2 We choose to analyze the individual
forecasters rather their behaviour en masse in terms of aggregate quantities. This allows us
to make statements such as, say, x% of forecasters appear to herd (using test T1, say) rather
than testing a hypothesis that forecasters taken together behave in a certain way.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a stylized model with heterogeneity
resulting from private information or idiosyncratic errors. A number of theories of forecaster
behaviour are then discussed (section 2.2), and we show how some of these models can
be subsumed within the stylized model, at least in terms of whether they will give rise to
apparent herding behaviour. Section 3 describes the tests of forecaster herding, and derives
the population outcomes under di¤erent models of behaviour using the stylized model of
section 2.1. Section 4 records the results of applying the tests of herding to the US SPF
output growth and ination expectations, and weighs the evidence for herding based on
the analyses of section 3. Section 5 concludes. A separate appendix provides the technical
details.
2 MODELLING FORECASTER DISAGREEMENT
We rst present a simple framework consisting of a stylized model which captures the essence
of some of the behavioural models (discussed in section 2.2) in terms of determining the
outcomes of the herding tests described in section 3.1. The model of heterogeneous forecasters
allows roles for private information, and idiosyncratic error or noise.
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2.1 Stylized Model Containing Key Features of Various Theory
Models
The variable yt is assumed to be generated by a rst-order autoregressive process:
yt = yt 1 + wt: (1)
At t   1, each agent observes yt 1 and a private signal sit, where sit = yt + "it. Hence the
optimal forecast (in a minimum mean-squared error sense) is given by:
yitjt 1 = (1  i) yt 1 + isit
which can be written alternatively as:
yitjt 1 = iwt + yt 1 + i"it
where i = 2w=
 
2w + 
2
"i

. Here, 2w = E (w
2
t ), 
2
"i
= E ("2it), and E (wt) = 0, E ("it) = 0 .
Below we assume that 2"i = 
2
", for all i, so that i =  for all i. We also assume that the "its
are serially uncorrelated, are uncorrelated across individuals at all leads and lags, and are
uncorrelated with the wts at all leads and lags. In addition, we are implicitly assuming that
the agents t 1 information set includes yt 1 (and additional lags if the data were generated
by a higher-order autoregressive process). This is a simple way of generating disagreement,
and is consistent with agents behaving rationally, although the source or substance of the
private information in a macro-forecasting context is unclear.
We assume that agents only receive a signal about the next period (relative to the forecast
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origin). Hence the 2-step forecast iterates forward the 1-step forecast using equation (1), i.e.,
yitjt 2 = y
i
t 1jt 2:
with:
yit 1jt 2 = (1  ) yt 2 + sit 1:
When calculating consensus forecasts, we assume N 1
P
i "it = 0, so that e.g.,
ytjt 1 = wt + yt 1:
Much of the recent literature suggests a role for an idiosyncratic error in explaining forecaster
behaviour.3 We alternatively refer to this as noise. We use noise as a catch-all term to
encompass the implications of a broad range of forecasting behaviours, as outlined in section
2.2. The noise error v is specic to the forecaster i, the target t, and the forecast horizon h,
denoted vi;tjt h for an h-step ahead forecast of yt. Hence the 1-step ahead forecast by agent
i becomes:
yitjt 1 = wt + yt 1 + "it + vi;tjt 1 (2)
where E

v2i;tjt h

= 2v for all i, t and h, and E
 
vi;tjt h; vi1;t1jt1 h1

= 0 whenever one of
i1 6= i, t1 6= t, h1 6= h is true. We also assume that " and v are uncorrelated across individuals
and time, including E
 
"itvi;tjt 1

= 0. We assume N 1
P
i vit;t h = 0 so that the consensus
is una¤ected by noise.
Under these assumptions, the h-step ahead forecast of yt by individual i is given by their
conditional expectation of yt given the available information I it h = (yt h; si;t h+1), plus the
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noise, vi;tjt h, i.e.,
yitjt h = E
 
yt j I it h

+ vi;tjt h;
where
E
 
yt j I it h

= h 1yit h+1jt h
= h 1 (wt h+1 + yt h + "it h+1) :
In this model, ytjt h =2 I it h, because I it h does not include

sj;t h+1jt h
	
j = 1; : : : ; N except
for j = i.
To summarize: in our simple model forecaster disagreement can be driven by private
information or noise. A key distinction between the two is that the former is consistent with
forecaster e¢ ciency, in the sense that the forecasts are uncorrelated with the forecast errors,4
whereas noise results in forecasts which violate this property. For example, the 1-step ahead
forecast error is:
yt   yitjt 1 = yt 1 + wt  
 
wt + yt 1 + "it + vitjt 1

= wt (1  )  "it   vitjt 1
so that:
Cov
 
yt   yitjt 1; yitjt 1

= E
 
wt (1  )  "it   vitjt 1
  
wt + yt 1 + "it + vitjt 1

(3)
=  2v;
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which is zero in the absence of noise. This derivation uses  = 2w= (
2
w + 
2
"). Hence we
interpret noise in a wide sense to denote any element of the forecast which does not enhance
the (squared-error) accuracy of the forecast, or alternatively, is correlated with the forecast
error. That is, the noise term captures deviations from rational forecasts (where rational is
dened relative to a squared-error loss function). This gives a precise denition of the noise
term in terms of its properties. 5 This denition does not preempt the noise term having a
behavioural interpretation. As shown in the following section, the source, or interpretation,
of the noise term will depend on the behavioural model being considered. Hence the noise
term is not to be interpreted as solely reecting reporting error.
We next consider models of forecaster behaviour which have been proposed in the liter-
ature, and show how these t within our stylized model.
2.2 Theory Models of Forecaster Behaviour
We briey review the theory models that generate forecaster disagreement in sections 2.2.1
to 2.2.4. The salient features of these models from the perspective of testing for herding
can be cast in the stylized model framework of section 2.1. In section 2.2.5 we consider two
models of informational rigidities which do not t neatly within our framework.
2.2.1 Private information and non-optimal weights
In the stylized model, we assume that the agent is forecast (equation (2)) is generated
by choosing  to optimally weight private information. Hence the forecasts are formed e¢ -
ciently: the corresponding individual forecast errors and forecasts are uncorrelated. However,
non-optimal weighting (using e.g., e 6= ) would result in forecaster disagreement generated
in part by noise. Formally, the 1-step forecast (2) becomes (assuming no initial idiosyncratic
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error, 2v = 0):
yitjt 1 = ewt + yt 1 + e"it (4)
= wt + yt 1 + "it +
evi;tjt 1z }| {e  wt + e   "it (5)
where evi;tjt 1 is the inducednoise from the use of non-optimal weights. The importance of
the noise component will depend on the magnitude of the divergence
e  .
We have assumed forecasters do not weigh private information optimally, but a closely
related situation would be the di¤erential interpretation of public information, as in e.g.,
Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999) and Manzan (2011)).
2.2.2 Heterogeneous beliefs about long-run outcomes
Patton and Timmermann (2010) suggest the observed disagreement among forecasters may
in part reect the inuence of di¤erent views about the long-run values of variables like
ination and output growth. Suppose that agent is forecast based on recent information is
E
 
yt j I it 1

, and we sharpen the analysis by assuming, say E
 
yt j I it 1

= tjt 1, for all i.
This forecast is weighted by each forecaster with their prior for the long-run growth rate, i,
to give agent is reported forecast as:
yitjt 1 = !i + (1  !)tjt 1:
In the stylized model, we suppose that agents observe yt 1 when forming their forecasts yitjt 1,
then from equation (1) tjt 1  yt 1.6 We further suppose i = E (yt) + "i, E ("i) = 0 and
E ("2i ) = 
2
" for all i, where for yt = yt 1 + wt we have E (yt) = 0. This captures the idea
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that agents have di¤erent long-run expectations (which are assumed to be time invariant).
However it then follows that the optimal weight on i in agent is forecast is ! = 0, in terms
of minimizing squared-error loss. Hence forecaster heterogeneity arising from ! 6= 0 will
constitute idiosyncratic error or noise.
2.2.3 Heterogeneous forecasting models
Giacomini et al. (2015) allow for heterogeneity in models, interpreted in a wide sense to
include the use of di¤erent statistical models to generate forecasts as well as judgment or
incentive-driven adjustments. They implement this idea by assuming individual specic
intercepts in the forecasting models. More generally, suppose in addition the autoregressive
parameter of the assumed AR(1) di¤ers across forecasters. Then in terms of our stylized
model, absent private information and other forms of idiosyncratic error:
yitjt 1 = E
 
yt j I it 1

= ci + iyt 1:
Hence model heterogeneity generates disagreement. We can write yitjt 1 = yt 1 + ci +
(i   ) yt 1, where the term ci + (i   ) yt 1 generates a non-zero correlation between the
forecast error and forecast (compare to equation (3)), and plays the role of idiosyncratic
error in terms of the herding test results derived in section 3.2.
2.2.4 Heterogeneous degrees of loss asymmetry
Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) provide an explanation for forecaster heterogeneity in
terms of agents having asymmetric loss functions characterized by di¤ering degrees of asym-
metry. Consider the LINEX(LINear-EXponential) loss function7 dened on the forecast
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error e:
C (e; 'i) = b [exp ('ie)  'ie  1] , 'i 6= 0, b  0
where for 'i > 0, loss is approximately linear for e < 0 (over-predictions), and exponential for
e > 0 (under-predictions). Suppose ination is conditionally Gaussian (i.e., given information
in the previous period ), ytjt 1  N

tjt 1; 
2
tjt 1

, then it follows that the optimal predictor
for agent i is given by:
yitjt 1 = tjt 1 +
'i
2
2tjt 1: (6)
Hence even full-information rational expectations forecasters will make biased forecasts and
will disagree in terms of their reported forecasts. Optimal forecasts under heterogeneous
degrees of loss asymmetry will manifest as forecasts with idiosyncratic errors or noise, when
evaluated using a squared error loss function, so will tend to (falsely) indicate (anti-)herding
behaviour. In terms of the stylized model, we can relate (6) to the 1-step ahead forecast
given by equation (2) by noting that tjt 1  yt 1, and 'i2 2tjt 1 plays the role of vi;tjt 1 (and
in addition there is no private information, so  = 0). The cross-sectional average of the
vis will be zero (as in the stylized model) assuming the 'is are symmetrically distributed
about zero, but the direct equivalence between 'i
2
2tjt 1 and vi;tjt 1 fails unless we assume
E

'i
2
2tjt 1
'j
2
2tjt 1

= 0, for i 6= j..
When the disturbances in the underlying model are conditionally homoscedastic, as in
the stylized model, i.e., E (w2t j It 1) = 2w, then the individuals forecasts will be scattered
about tjt 1 = yt 1 but the deviations will not vary with t (because now
'i
2
2tjt 1 =
'i
2
2w).
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2.2.5 Information Rigidities
The theory models discussed hitherto have the propery that at time t  h, an agents infor-
mation set includes the history of the variable through yt h: I it h =

yt h; yt (h+1); : : :
	
, in
addition to any private or public signals. As a consequence, the framework we have adopted
implies that
n
yjtjt (h+s)
o
for all j and for s = 1; 2; : : :, does not constitute relevant informa-
tion (in terms of minimizing squared error loss) for an agent forecasting yt at time t   h.
Consequently, aggregate summaries of that information, such as the consensus forecast de-
ned by ytjt (h+s) = N
 1P
i y
i
tjt (h+s), s = 1; 2; : : :, have no role to play either. But when
there is either of the two types of informational rigidity discussed below, ytjt (h+s) remains
valuable in an accuracyenhancing sense.
Sticky Information Sticky information assumes that in each period, each agent updates
their information (relative to the previous period) with probability 1 . When they do up-
date, they acquire full information, and form expectations rationally: see inter alia Mankiw
and Reis (2002) and Mankiw et al. (2003), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). In terms
of forecasting yt h-steps ahead, the mean forecast across individuals can be shown to be
given by:
ytjt h = (1  )
1X
k=0
kE
 
yt j I it (h+k)

where E
 
yt j I it s

is the full-information rational expectations forecast made at time t  s
(where s  h).
Whereas we establish in section 3.2 that our tests of herding will not falsely show up as
(anti-)herding when there is private information, that result is predicated on (e.g.,) ytjt (h+1)
providing no useful information. This is not the case for sticky information forecasters.
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For those forecasters who have not updated recently, and whose forecasts are given by
E

yt j I it (h+k)

, for k > 1, the consensus contains useful information, and the tests of
herding will be shown to falsely reject the no-herding null hypothesis. This is discussed
further in section 3.
Noisy Information Noisy information assumes agents base their forecasts on the latest
information, but only ever observe noisy signals about economic fundamentals: see Wood-
ford (2002), Sims (2003) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), inter alia. Unlike sticky
information models, agents are assumed to base their forecasts on the latest information,
but this never reveals fundamentals (such as the ination rate and real output growth).
The model in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) assumes an AR(1) process for the
unobserved state variable:
yt = yt 1 + wt, wt  iidN
 
0; 2w

and that each agent receives a signal common to all as well as a specic signal, i.e., zit =
[sit, st]
0 where:
sit = yt + "it
st = yt + t;
with "it  iidN (0; 2"), t  iidN
 
0; 2

, E (t"is) = 0 8i; t; s. The agent makes optimal
forecasts of yt h-steps ahead given his assumed information set, i.e., yitjt h = E
 
yt j zit h; zit (h+1); : : :

,
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and also zitjt h = E
 
zit j zit h; zit (h+1); : : :

. Using the Kalman lter, it follows that:
yitjt = (1  PH) yit 1jt 1 + PHyt + P""it + Pt (7)
where H = [1 1]0, and P = [P"; P] =

	2
	(2"+2)+2"2
; 	
2
"
	(2"+2)+2"2

with P"; P 2 (0; 1) and
	 the variance-covariance matrix of the one-step ahead forecast error for yt (see Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2012) for details). Note that as 2" ! 0 the degree of information rigidity
regarding the private signal lessens and P" ! 1.
The forecasters have private information, in the form of private signals, but the key
di¤erence relative to the model in section 2.1 is that the history of fytg remains unobserved:
each forecaster is information set consists only of his set of (private and public) signals
fzit; zit 1; : : :g. Consequently, the consensus forecast will always contain valuable information
and this will cause the tests to (wrongly) indicate imitative behaviour.
One could envisage privateforecasts being based on private signals, as in equation (7),
but suppose that professional forecasters would not forego the opportunity to improve fore-
cast accuracy by adaptingtheir forecasts to the consensus, or lagged consensus. However,
this would go against the grain of the noisy information model considered in the literature.
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3 PROPERTIES OF APPROACHES TO TESTING
FOR HERDING
3.1 Tests
There are a number of papers that model an agents forecasts, using the consensus forecast
as an explanatory factor: e.g., Batchelor and Dua (1992), Bewley and Fiebig (2002) and
Gallo et al. (2002). As an example, consider Gallo et al. (2002) (GGJ), who suggest testing
for herding based on the properties of successive individual forecasts of the same xed event
(yt) and consensus forecasts of the same event, using the following regression:
yitjt h = 0 + 1y
i
tjt (h+1) + 2ytjt (h+1) + ut; (8)
where yitjt h denotes the forecast by individual i made at t   h about yt, and a bar (and
omission of the i-subscript) denotes a consensus forecast. (For simplicity, we omit the i-
subscript from the parameters). This is their equation (1), but omitting their additive
term in the group variance of the h + 1 periods ahead forecast. GGJ o¤er an alternative
re-parameterisation, given by:
yitjt h   ytjt (h+1) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+1)

+ (1 + 2   1)ytjt (h+1) + ut
= 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+1)

+ 2ytjt (h+1) + ut: (9)
Based on equations (8) and (9), they argue that 1 is expected to be positive (the choice of
forecast ... can be expected to be consistently on the same side of the sample mean..., p.12),
and that for an imitation e¤ectwe require 2 6= 0 (in equation (8)), and for an imitation
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e¤ect and shrinkage to the mean(i.e., herding), we require 2 6= 0 and 2 = 1+2 1 < 0
(in equation (9)).
However, ytjt (h+1) will not be known at the time y
i
tjt (h+1) is made, and may provide
useful information (in an accuracy-enhancing sense). In order to obtain a cleaner test of
herding, we replace ytjt (h+1) by ytjt (h+2) in equation (8) (and therefore also equation (9)) so
that the consensus is known at time t  (h+1) and so ought not inuence the LHS forecast
revision if forecasts are e¢ cient. In the results section we check whether the inference we
make regarding herding is sensitive to the omission of the forecast dispersion term.
We estimate the regressions for each individual for a given h using variation over t. The
parameters are not explicitly subscripted by individual, but we stress that all the regressions
we run are for a given pair of i and h, using variation over t. This allows for individuals
to exhibit heterogeneous behaviour, and for that behaviour to be horizon specic: a given
forecaster may consider othersforecasts at some horizons, but not at others.
Hence we estimate:
yitjt h = 0 + 1y
i
tjt (h+1) + 2ytjt (h+2) + ut (10)
yitjt h   ytjt (h+1) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+2)

+ 2ytjt (h+2) + ut (11)
for each i separately, and for each of h = 1; 2 and 3, using variation over t. We call this
testing approach T1, and we are interested in 2 in equation (10) and 2 in equation (11).
A related approach is simply to test whether yitjt h   yitjt (h+1) is negatively correlated
with yitjt (h+1)  ytjt (h+2), so that if last quarters forecast exceeds the consensus the current
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forecast is lowered relative to last periods. This corresponds to 1 < 0 in:
yitjt h   yitjt (h+1) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+2)

+ ut (12)
and is referred to as test T2. While 1 < 0 indicates herding, 1 > 0 indicates anti-herding.
This can be motivated as a test for forecaster e¢ ciency in a xed-event setting: see, e.g.,
Nordhaus (1987) and Clements (1995, 1997). Clearly, the future forecast revision yitjt h  
yitjt (h+1) (from the standpoint of the h+1-step forecast y
i
tjt (h+1)) should not be predictable
from information available at that time if information is being used e¢ ciently. It is a test
for herding because we test in the direction of the revision being related to the divergence
of the earlier forecast from the consensus. Tests based on equation (12) can also be derived
by re-parameterising (10) as:
yitjt h   yitjt (h+1) = 0 + (1   1)

yitjt (h+1)  
2
1  1
ytjt (h+2)

+ ut (13)
and then imposing 1+2 1 = 0, such that 1 from equation (12) corresponds to (1   1).
The assumption that at t  (h+ 1) the latest consensus forecast known by the forecaster
is ytjt (h+2) is conservative. Although each forecaster will typically not know the current
forecasts of all the others in response to the particular survey in question, it may be rea-
sonable to assume that professional forecasters e¤ectively have this information assuming
they are cognizant of the prevailing view of the forecasting community about the outlook
for key macro-aggregates such as GDP growth and ination. Hence one might proceed as if
the current consensus (ytjt (h+1)) were known. Use of the lagged consensus ytjt (h+2) perhaps
assumes too little - that a forecasters view of the consensus is anchored to what it was a
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quarter of a year ago (in the case of the quarterly US Survey of Professional Forecasters).
Such an approach may fail to reject (anti-)herding when present simply because forecasters
consider the current consensus, and not the previous quarters consensus. In the empirical
work we will also consider the less conservative assumption, and in place of equation (12)
we estimate:
yitjt h   yitjt (h+1) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+1)

+ ut; (14)
as well as equations (8) and (9) in place of equations (10) and (11).
The nal approach (T3) is based on Bernhardt et al. (2006) (henceforth, BCK). Their
approach supposes that if a forecasters current reported forecast exceeds the consensus, then
a forecaster who herds (anti-herds) will have moved his/her forecast towards (away from)
the consensus, making it more likely that the error associated with that forecast will be
positive (negative). The approach was developed in the context of assessing the behaviour
of professional nancial analysts, but has since been applied in a number of contexts (see,
Pierdzioch et al. (2010) and Pierdzioch and Rülke (2012), inter alia). The approach is
generally used to assess all the forecasters en masse, although in principle it can be applied to
individual forecasters, to allow that some forecasters may herd, others anti-herd, and others
do neither. Because the test is non-parametric and relies on the large-sample distribution
of the test statistic, formal application of the approach to the relatively small samples of
forecasts typically available for an individual forecaster may prove unreliable. For this reason
we instead report a parametric, regression-based implementation of their approach. This
strongly points toward anti-herding, as opposed to herding, in our sample of professional
forecasters.
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The test is implemented in the regression:
yt   yitjt h = 0 + 1
 
yitjt h   ytjt (h+1)

+ wt (15)
The reported forecast of a respondent is supposed to have been moved towards the consensus
relative to the respondents private (undisclosed) forecast when a respondent herds. By pri-
vateis simply meant the forecast which would be made in the absence of any (anti-)herding
e¤ects. Hence if the private h-step forecast exceeded the h+ 1-step consensus, the reported
forecast yitjt h will still exceed the consensus, but if the private forecast was an unbiased
forecast, the reported forecast will fall short of the outcome on average. Consequently, we
would expect to see a positive association between the LHS and RHS variables, and 1 > 0.
When the reported forecast is moved further from the consensus relative to the private fore-
cast, the respondent is said to exaggerate his/her di¤erences, or anti-herd, and is indicated
by 1 < 0.
The non-parametric test of Bernhardt et al. (2006) is based on the sum of two conditional
probabilities: the probability that the reported forecast exceeds the outcome conditional on
the forecast exceeding the consensus, CP1 = Pr

yt < y
i
tjt h j ytjt (h+1) < yitjt h

, and the
probability that the reported forecast is less than the outcome conditional on the forecast
being less than the consensus, CP2 = Pr

yt > y
i
tjt h j ytjt (h+1) > yitjt h

. If we set +t = 1
if yitjt h > ytjt (h+1), and 
 
t = 1 if y
i
tjt h < ytjt (h+1), and dene the joint events as 
+
t = 1 if
yitjt h > ytjt (h+1) and y
i
tjt h > yt, and 
 
t = 1 if y
i
tjt h < ytjt (h+1) and y
i
tjt h < yt, then their
test statistic S is calculated as:
S =
1
2
P
t 
+
tP
t 
+
t
+
P
t 
 
tP
t 
 
t

: (16)
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This is asymptotically normally distributed N

0:5; 1
16
h P
t 
+
t
 1
+
 P
t 
 
t
 1i
under the
null of no (anti-)herding. Given the relatively small numbers of forecasts available for each
respondent and the asymptotic justication of the test, we choose to use the test statistic S
as an indicator of a tendency to herd or anti-herd rather than a formal hypothesis test.
3.2 Population Values of the Parameters in the Regression-based
Tests of Herding for the Stylized Model
Based on moment calculations in the Appendix for the model of forecaster behaviour detailed
in section 2.1, we present the population values of the key parameters underlying the tests
of (anti-)herding. For simplicitly, we assume h = 1 but expressions are valid for any h.
3.2.1 T1: Adapted from Gallo et al. (2002)
Firstly, consider the approach of GGJ. In the Appendix we calculate the relevant moments
for the model in section 2.1. For equations (10) and (11) we nd:
2 =
2v
 
62y + 
42w
 
42y + 
22w + 
2
v
  
62y + 
422w
   62y + 42w2 , 2 = 0:
Hence 2 = 0 when there is no idiosyncratic error, but otherwise 2 > 0, suggesting either
herding or anti-herding. However, 2 = 0 even in the presence of noise or idiosyncratic error.
We can investigate the implications of falsely assuming the forecasters know the forecasts
of others. If we were to incorrectly assume agents knew ytjt 2 at time t   2, and instead
estimated 2 in equation (8) and 2 in equation (9), we can show that:
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e2 = 2v  42y + 22w 
42y + 
222w
  
22"
2 + 2v
 ; e2 =  (1  )
2
 
1  2 1 + 2 :
Now the incorrect informational assumption results in e2 > 0, suggesting anti-herding be-
haviour when we mistakenly assume forecasters know more about the forecasts of others
than they do.
3.2.2 T2: Forecast revisions
Next, in the Appendix we establish that the population value of the slope parameter 1 in
equation (12) is:
1 =
 2v
2w
2
 
+ 2 (1  )2+ 2v : (17)
Hence  1 < 1 6 0. 1 will equal zero when the noise or idiosyncratic error is zero, but will
approach  1 as the variance of the idiosyncratic error gets large relative to the variance of
the underlying shocks, 2w.
To investigate the e¤ects of assuming forecasters know the contemporaneous forecasts of
others, we consider regression equation (14) instead of equation (12). The population value
of 1 in equation (14) is: e1 =  1 (18)
regardless of whether or not there is noise. Assuming forecasters know more than they do
will manifest as herding behaviour.
3.2.3 T3: Based on Bernhardt et al. (2006)
Consider the regression equivalent of Bernhardt et al. (2006).
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yt   yitjt 1 = 0 + 1
 
yitjt 1   ytjt 2

+ wt: (19)
In the Appendix we establish that:
1 =
 2v
2w
 
+ (1  )2 2+ 2v :
This behaves similarly to 1: 1 is zero when there is no noise, but approaches  1 as the
noise component becomes large relative to the variance of the underlying disturbances.
Assuming agents know more than they do in this context would amount to replacing
ytjt 2 by ytjt 1 in (19). Then it is straightforward to show that:
e1 =  1;
indicating herding even in the absence of idiosyncratic error.
3.3 Population Values of the Parameters in the Regression-based
Tests of Herding for the Noisy Information Model
In this section we provide the outcomes (in population) of the herding tests when there is
noisy information.
Firstly, for T1 we calculate the population value of 2 in equation (11). To simplify the
algebra, we have ignored the public signal st, and suppose agents only receive sit. Hence we
assume that 2 =1, and P" is re-dened accordingly and we denote this by P , and H = 1.
In the Appendix we detail the calculation of:
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2 =
(1  P )  1  (1  P ) 2 1 2"h
(2w + 
2
")
 
1  2 1 h1 + 2  1  (1  P )2 1 (1  P ) 2i  2w2 (1  P )2  1  (1  P ) 2 2i
and establish that 2 > 0. Further, 2 ! 0 when 2" ! 0 (and P ! 1 indicating declining
informational rigidity).
Next, we consider the T2 test of herding based on forecast revisions, and calculate the
population value of 1 for regression equation (12), which uses the lagged consensus:
1 =
PH

1  (1  PH)2 2 1  (1  PH)PH2w   P 2" 2" + 2PH (1  PH)P 2 2  PHP 2 2
1  (1  PH)2 2 1  P 2" 2" + (PH)2 2w + 2P 2 2+ P 2 2 :
(20)
A simpler expression results from again ignoring the public signal st. Then equation (20)
simplies to:
1 =
((1  P )2w   P2")
(2" + 
2
w)
:
One can show that 1 < 0, and 1 ! 0 when 2" ! 0 (and P ! 1, the signal becomes
increasingly informative and the degree of informational rigidity declines) and when 2" !1
(the signal becomes uninformative and the degree of informational rigidity increases): see
Appendix. Hence for intermediate values of the rigidity parameter, T2 will indicate herding
when there is noisy information.
Although the use of the t   2 consensus does not provide a valid test of herding, were
we to apply such a test using equation (14) when there is noisy information (private and
public), we would obtain:
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1 =
Cov

yitjt 1   yitjt 2; yitjt 2   ytjt 2

V ar

yitjt 2   ytjt 2
 =  PH (21)
Since PH 2 (0; 1), and PH ! 1 as rigidity lessens, this has a simple intuitive explanation.
The evidence for herding will increase (1 !  1) as rigidity lessens, because in response
to less noisy signals individual forecasters place more weight on their private signals, sit.
The consensus forecast aggregates the private information, and so the (negative) correlation
between yitjt 1   yitjt 2 and yitjt 2   ytjt 2 increases, and with it the evidence of herding.
In terms of the T3 test, in the Appendix we derive the following result under the null of
noisy information (and assuming no public information, for simplicity):
1 =
 P2"

1  (1  P )2 2 1 + 2w 1  (1  P ) 2 1 n1  P 1  (1  P )22 1o
P (2w + 
2
")

1  (1  P )2 2 1 :
We can show that 1 < 0, and so T3 will indicate anti-herding when there is noisy information.
As for the other tests, 1 ! 0 as 2" ! 0.
For the sticky information model of section 2.2.5, we do not provide formal derivations of
the population values of the test regressions for the individual forecaster, as the implications
of the theory are most readily applicable at the aggregate level (e.g., in terms of the properties
of the aggregate forecast and forecast errors, etc.). However it follows immediately from the
argument in section 2.2.5 that for individual forecasters who have not updated recently
the consensus will contain useful information, and will help predict subsequent (updated)
forecasts made by those individuals. Hence the tests of herding will falsely reject the no-
herding null hypothesis.
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3.4 Summary of the Properties of the Tests of (Anti-)Herding
We collect the results concerning the properties of the tests in the following propositions.
Proposition 1. When forecaster heterogeneity is driven by noise (idiosyncratic errors),
the T2 test (H0: 1 = 0 in equation (12)) will tend to suggest herding, because  1 < 1 < 0,
and 1 !  1 as the importance of the idiosyncratic errors increases relative to the variance
of the true innovations to the process. The T2 test will also indicate herding when forecaster
heterogeneity is driven by noisy information.
Proposition 2. When forecaster heterogeneity is driven by noise, the T3 test (H0: 1 = 0
in equation (15)) will suggest anti-herding, because the population value of 1 tends to
 1 as the importance of the idiosyncratic errors increases relative to the variance of the
true innovations to the process. The T3 test will also indicate anti-herding when forecaster
heterogeneity is driven by noisy information.
Proposition 3. Under forecaster heterogeneity driven by noise, the T1 testing procedure
performs as follows: the test of H0: 1 = 0 (in equation (10)) will reject the null of (anti-
)herding, but the test of H0: 2 = 0 in the re-parameterised equation (11) will not reject.
However, the test of H0: 2 = 0 will reject in favour of 2 > 0 when disagreement is driven
by noisy information.
Proposition 4. If agents have access to less information than is assumed in the speci-
cation of the test regression, all the testing approaches will reject the (anti-)herding null
(irrespective of whether there are idiosyncratic errors).
Propositions 1 3 indicate that di¤erences between forecasters due to idiosyncratic errors
will falsely indicate (anti-)herding for all the tests considered other than the test of the null
that 2 = 0 of T1. This suggests that one component of the T1 testing procedure (namely,
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that 2 = 0) can be used as a reliable test of (anti-)herding, in that it will not falsely reject
the no-herding null due to idiosyncratic error.8 Note that all tests (including H0: 2 = 0)
will reject the no-herding null when there is noisy information.
Proposition 4 asserts that even tests based on 2 = 0 will falsely indicate herding when
we incorrectly attribute to agents more information than they have. It might appear that
ensuring the consensus forecast is known to all forecasters (by taking the consensus made
far enough in the past, for example) would guard against falsely nding herding based on
testing 2 = 0. However, this is not true for some recent theories of expectations formation
involving informational rigidities, such as the noisy and sticky information models discussed
here. Explicit expressions for the test parameters are given for the noisy information model,
and are shown to not equal zero, suggesting these tests will indicate herding.
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Description of Forecast Data
We use the US Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) as our source of expectations. It
is a quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasters of the US economy, providing a record
of expectations from 1968 to the present day. It began life as the NBER-ASA survey in
1968:4, and since June 1990 has been run by the Philadelphia Fed, renamed as the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF): see Zarnowitz (1969) and Croushore (1993). Partly because
of its length, it is a popular choice for academic research on expectations. As of August
1 2014, the Academic Bibliography maintained by the Philadelphia Fed listed 87 research
papers based on the SPF forecast data (see http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
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data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/academic-bibliography.cfm.)
SPF respondents are asked to provide forecasts of a number of macroeconomic variables,
and we choose to analyze the forecasts of real GDP growth and (the GDP-deator measure
of) ination. We analyze the forecasts of the survey quarter, the next quarter, and each of
the next three quarters. We have 181 quarterly surveys from 1968:Q4 to 2013:Q4. Prior
to 1981:3 the point predictions for output referred to nominal output, but a series for real
output has been imputed (by the Philadelphia Fed) from the forecasts of nominal output
and the deator.
We call forecasts of the current-quarter9 horizon h = 1 forecasts. Then we have 3 separate
sets of pairs of forecasts of the same event: the h = 2 and h = 1 forecasts, the h = 3 and
h = 2 forecasts, and nally the h = 4 and h = 3 forecasts (with the h = 5 forecasts being
used to construct the consensus in this last case). For example, the rst pair of h = 1 and
h = 2 forecasts are the 1969:Q1 survey h = 1 forecast and the 1968:Q4 survey h = 2 forecast,
both of the value of the variable in 1969:Q1. The last pair are the 2013:Q1 h = 1 and the
2012:Q4 h = 2 forecasts (both of 2013:Q1).
These samples of pairs of xed-event forecasts can be used to construct the tests of
(anti-)herding described in section 3. When actual values are required, as in the tests based
on BCK, we use the vintage value two-quarters after the reference quarter, taken from the
Real Time Data Set for Macroeconomists (RTDSM) run by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia (see Croushore and Stark (2001)). So, for example, the forecasts of 1969:Q1
would be compared to the actual value for 1969:Q1 recorded in the 1969:Q3 quarterly vintage.
This seems preferable to using a vintage from many years later as this will contain revisions
and denitional changes (see e.g., Landefeld et al. (2008) for a discussion of the revisions to
US national accounts data).
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What we refer to as the lagged consensus forecast is from the individual forecasts of the
target in the survey one quarter before the earlier of the two forecasts being compared. To
make matters concrete, consider again the example above, of the h = 1 forecast made in
response to the 1969:Q1 survey, and the h = 2 forecast submitted to the 1968:Q4. These are
both of the same target period: the value of the variable in 1969:Q1. The lagged consensus
forecast corresponding to this pair of (individual) forecasts would be based on the h = 3
forecasts (of 1969:Q1) submitted to the 1968:Q3 survey. The results of a survey are made
known shortly after the survey responses have been led, so will be known well before the
next survey. In the above example, the current consensus would be the consensus of the
h = 2 forecasts submitted to the 1969:Q4 survey. Because it is contemporaneous with the
individuals forecast, the individual will not know the SPF consensus. However, it may be
reasonable to assume a professional forecaster will e¤ectively know the consensus from other
sources. Our central case uses the lagged consensus, and so is uncontroversial in terms of
what the forecasters know.
4.2 Empirical Findings
Table 2 reports the evidence for (anti-)herding based on equations (10) and (11) from test
T1, and on equation (12) for test T2. We adopt the conservative assumption that forecasters
only know the lagged consensus. We run regressions (10), (11) and (12) on all the forecasts
of a given horizon for each individual who reported a su¢ cient number of forecasts. We
require 10 or more forecasts of a given horizon. This requirement was satised by around
150 individuals for each horizon. We subsequently check the sensitivity of the results to this
requirement. For T1 we report the proportion of regressions for which (i) we rejected the
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null that 2 = 0 in equation (10), (ii) we rejected the null that 2 = 0 (in equation (10))
and 2 = 0 (in equation (11)) in favour of 2 6= 0 and 2 < 0, and (iii) 2 = 0 against 2 6= 0
(in equation (11)). For T2, the Table reports: (i) the rejection frequency of a one-sided test
of 1 = 0 versus 1 < 0 (indicating herding), (ii) the rejection frequency of 1 = 0 versus
1 > 0 (signifying anti-herding), and (iii) the proportion for which neither is found.
10
In terms of the interpretation of T1 of GGJ, the results indicate (anti-)herding (2 6= 0)
for around one quarter of the forecasters for ination and for output growth. However, the
results of (ii) indicate that rarely do we nd herding (as dened by GGJ) with 2 6= 0
and 2 < 0. Moreover, (iii) indicates that 2 = 0 is rejected for relatively few forecasters.
Remember that the equations we have estimated are an adaptation of GGJ, and instead we
interpret 2 = 0 as the no-herding null when there is idiosyncratic error.
The ndings are little a¤ected by the forecast horizon. Recall that the results for h = 1
are based on the revision between the forecasts of the current survey quarter value, and the
forecasts of that target made in the previous survey. The results for h = 2 relate to the
forecasts of the next quarter, and the forecast of that quarter made in the previous quarter,
and so on. In short, Table 2 provides evidence of (anti-)herding (2 6= 0) but little evidence
of herding (2 6= 0 and 2 < 0).
If we include the forecast dispersion term (namely, the cross-sectional variance of the
forecasts used to calculate the consensus) in the regressions, the results of the tests for
herding are largely unchanged. This could be interpreted as suggesting that the degree of
uncertainty (as proxied by the group variance) does not have a measurable e¤ect on whether
this approach suggests herding.
The T2 test has 1 = 0 rejected in favour of 1 < 0 for around 60% of ination, with the
proportion declining to around one third for output growth at the shortest horizon. There
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are virtually no instances where 1 = 0 is rejected in favour of 1 > 0.
We report the results of T3 tests based on equation (15) in Table 3. When we reject
1 = 0 it is mostly in the direction of 1 < 0. This occurs for around half of the ination
forecasters, and around one third of the output growth forecasters. This evidence of anti-
herding is backed up by the estimates of S (equation (16)), which exceed one half for in
excess of 80% of forecasters for ination, with only slightly lower proportions for the output
growth forecasts.
Care has to be taken to ensure the tests are based on appropriate estimates of the
standard error of the coe¢ cient estimates. The t-tests of 1 = 0 in Table 3 are based on
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors because of the usual issue of
overlapping forecasts. When h > 1, a forecast is made before the actual value corresponding
to the previous forecast becomes known, engendering correlation in sequences of multi-step
forecast errors even for optimal forecasts. For h = 1 only a correction for heteroscedasticity
is made. The tests in Table 2 do not involve actual values, and only a correction for possible
heteroscedasticity is required, even for h > 1. To understand why this is the case, consider
for example two adjacent observations on the left-hand-side of equation (12): yitjt h yitjt (h+1)
and yit 1jt 1 h yit 1jt 1 (h+1), say. Under the null the revisions are serially uncorrelated even
when h > 1.11
Table 4 reports results when we require each forecaster to make a minimum of 30 forecasts
(compared to the requirement of 10 or more assumed hitherto). There are only around as
third as many respondents as previously, but the results are not changed in any important
respect. Hence the relatively small number of observations in the regressions underlying
Tables 2 and 3 are not driving the results.
Tables 5 and 6 report results for the current consensus: based on T1 equations (8) and (9),
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and T2 equation (14). 12 Generally there is more evidence of (anti-)herding, but otherwise
the pattern of results is little changed. Recall that we established in section 3 that the use
of the current consensus when this is unwarranted (not known to the individual forecasters)
increases the evidence of apparent (anti-)herding. As discussed earlier, it is a moot point
whether SPF respondents e¤ectively know the current consensus via other sources.
In sum, if the tests are taken at face value, their application to the SPF ination and
output growth forecast data suggests the following: the T2 tests indicate around one in
every two forecasters herds; radically di¤erent ndings result from T1 tests on the regression
parameters of 2 and 2, where there is little evidence of herding, or compared to the evidence
for anti-herding based on T3. However, based on our analysis of the properties of these tests,
the pattern of results suggests an absence of herding behaviour, and points to the di¤erences
between forecasters primarily reecting noise or idiosyncratic error, emanating from any one
of the theory-based explanations of forecast behaviour described in section 2.2. The evidence
against (anti-)herding behaviour is based on the relatively lower rejections rates of the no-
herding null using the T1 test of 2 = 0, compared to the evidence for herding based on T2,
and for anti-herding based on T3. Our analysis indicates that the T1 test of 2 = 0 is robust
to noise, whereas T2 and T3 will indicate herding and anti-herding, respectively, when there
is noise. These predictions are found in the forecast data.
This pattern of ndings is also broadly consistent with information rigidities, such as
noisy information, as shown in section 3.3. Noisy information would also suggest herding
based on T2, and anti-herding based on T3. The main point is that rejection of the null using
any of these testing procedures does not indicate macro-forecasters herd (or anti-herd).
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5 CONCLUSIONS
There is much interest in the literature concerning whether forecasters report their best
forecasts, where best is narrowly dened to mean most accurate, or whether forecasters are
unduly inuenced by others, as might be the case if their payo¤s depend on the positioning
of their forecasts in relation to the forecasts of others. A natural way of making this idea
testable is via the notion of herding or anti-herding, and to consider whether the changes in
an individuals forecasts of yt are systematically related to the past consensus.
In recent years a number of models of forecaster behaviour have been proposed to explain
forecaster dispersion, recognizing that the full-information rational expectations hypothesis
is unable to explain this empirical regularity. The models di¤er in terms of the assumed
environment in which agents operate, and in terms of the sorts of information they are privy
to, and the models they use, etc. However, in terms of determining the outcomes of the
tests of herding we consider, we show that what matters is whether the di¤erences between
forecasters reect private information or noise, and whether past values of summaries of the
forecast distribution (such as the consensus) remain informative because the past history of
the underlying series remains hidden. We show how the theory models t within this general
framework.
Our application of the herding tests to US SPF individual quarterly ination and out-
put growth forecasts for the period 1981 to 2013 taken at face value suggests a signicant
proportion of professional US macroeconomists appear to be inuenced by their fellow fore-
casters, with one test suggesting respondents deliberately exaggerate their di¤erences, while
another suggests herding (or consensus-seeking) is the dominant type of behaviour. However,
given our analysis of the properties of the herding tests, we are able to conclude that the
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empirical pattern of rejections that we observe across the di¤erent tests is consistent with
the pattern predicted by di¤erences amongst forecasters primarily reecting idiosyncratic
errors, or reecting noisy information. Either way, the evidence for (anti-)herding is far from
compelling.
The nding that apparent herding behaviour may result from forecaster heterogeneity due
to informational rigidities such as noisy information is interesting, given the recent attention
paid to testing such models (see, e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015), Andrade
and Le Bihan (2013) and Giacomini et al. (2015)). This arises from the noisy-information
model assumption that the underlying variable is only ever observed with error, and the as-
sumption that forecasters do not make use of the consensus forecast, even though it would be
benecial to do so in terms of improving forecast accuracy. The lagged consensus forecasts
will be related to the individuals forecast (or forecast revision) under noisy information,
and the herding tests considered in this paper will falsely indicate herding. Conceptually
herding behaviour and noisy information behaviour are quite di¤erent. Noisy-information
forecasters are rational, squared-error-loss minimizing agents, given the informational con-
straints they face, whereas (anti-)herding forecasters are not rational in terms of minimizing
mean-squared error. We leave for future research the possibility of developing an approach
able to discriminate between the two.
An implication of our paper is that the growing literature suggesting macro forecasters
often anti-herd (see, e.g., some of the later entries in Table 1) may simply reect heterogeneity
induced by idiosyncratic errors (and hence any one of a number of theory model explanations)
or noisy information. Our ndings suggest that some of the recent literature indicating
herding behaviour may be misleading.
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Notes
1Anti-herdingrefers to the behaviour of deliberately exaggerating the di¤erences between ones forecasts
and those of others, while herdinghas its natural interpretation.
2For example, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) show that there is a correlation between the mean
forecast error and the revision to xed-event aggregate forecasts of the target in a noisy information model.
This is an emergent property - it does not hold at the individual level assuming rational updating in response
to the receipt of the new information. As shown below, the implications for herding can be analyzed at the
individual level.
3For example, in the recent modelling of three-dimensional panels of forecasters, which allows for multiple
forecasters, multiple targets and multiple forecast horizons: see e.g., Davies and Lahiri (1995), and the review
article by Davies et al. (2011) for further discussion.
4See, for example, the realization-forecast regressions of Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969).
5The model of Davies and Lahiri (1995) allows forecasters to disagree because of xed individual-specic
biases and idiosyncratic errors, where the latter would appear to correspond to our vs. However, (Davies
and Lahiri, 1995, p. 209) suggest that these capture other factors(e.g., private information, measurement
error, etc.) . However, this conates noise and private information, which we keep separate because of their
di¤erent impacts on tests for herding.
6Patton and Timmermann (2010) assume agents receive a noisy public signal, and in that case E
 
yt j Iit 1

is the optimal forecast using the Kalman Filter, as discussed in section 2.2.5.
7See, e.g., Granger (1969) and Zellner (1986) for early contributions on asymmetric loss, and more recently
Elliott et al. (2005), Elliott et al. (2008), Patton and Timmermann (2007) and Lahiri and Liu (2009).
8Note that GGJ envisaged a di¤erent use of the test of 2 = 0, namely that, conditional on rejecting
2 = 0, nding 2 < 0 would indicate herding. However, 2 = 0 would be rejected because of idiosyncratic
error, so the suggestion of GGJ would likely result in the nding of anti-herding. However, we stress that their
implementation is not the same as ours: we lag the consensus by one period relative to the longer-horizon
individual forecast and we omit the measure of forecast dispersion.
Similar comments apply to T3. Our implementation is a regression-based adaptation of the original
non-parametric test of Bernhardt et al. (2006).
42
9That is, a forecast of 2012:Q1 made in response to the 2012:Q1 survey. This is termed 1-step, because
when the forecast of the survey-quarter value is made the most recent GDP growth and (GDP deator)
ination gures will be the advance estimates of the previous quarter.
10All tests were undertaken at the 5% level.
11This follows immediately if we consider a time series xt written as an innite-order moving average
xt =  (L) "t =
Ph
j=1  h j"t h+j +  h"t h +
P1
j=1  h+j"t h j :
Then xtjt h   xtjt (h+1) =  h"t h. Moreover, from
xt 1 =  (L) "t 1 =
Ph
j=1  h j"t 1 h+j +  h"t 1 h +
P1
j=1  h+j"t 1 h j ;
we have xt 1;t 1 h   xt 1;t 1 (h+1) =  h"t 1 h, and so
Cov
 
xtjt h   xtjt (h+1); xt 1;t 1 h   xt 1;t 1 (h+1)

= 0:
12In these implementations, we now have h = 4results, as these only require h = 5 forecasts, which are
available in the SPF.
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Table 1: Literature on Macro Forecasters and Herding
Study Finding
McNees (1989) Herding
Batchelor and Dua (1992) Variety-seeking behaviour(anti-herding)
Ashiya and Doi (2001) Herding
Lamont (2002) Herding based on age
Bewley and Fiebig (2002) Herding
Gallo et al. (2002) Imitation (herding) for the US forecasters
Pons-Novell (2003) Herding
Ashiya (2009) Make extreme forecasts to generate publicity
Pierdzioch et al. (2010) Anti-herding
Pierdzioch et al. (2012a) Anti-herding
Pierdzioch and Rülke (2012) Anti-herding
Pierdzioch et al. (2012b) Anti-herding
Rülke (2012) Anti-herding
Frenkel et al. (2012) Anti-herding
Frenkel et al. (2013) Anti-herding
Clements (2015) Evidence of herding and anti-herding depending on forecast horizon
Papastamos et al. (2015) Herding
Tsuchiya (2015) Herding and anti-herding
Tsuchiya and Kato (2015) Neither herding or anti-herding
Rülke et al. (2016) Anti-herding
The table includes papers from a search on Thomson Reuters Web of Science, of forecaster
herding. We omit papers outside the scope of macro and business forecasting, and papers
not reporting results of tests of herding. The papers are presented in chronological order.
There are a number of points to be borne in mind.
1. The denition and meaning of herding and anti-herding is not the same in all cases.
2. A variety of approaches to testing for herding are used.
For example, Lamont (2002) tests whether the pattern of forecast herding /scattering varies
signicantly over the professional lifetime of the forecasterbut does not consider whether
they are placing too much/little weight on the forecasts of others(p.268), and hence does not
test for herding as dened in this paper. McNees (1989) shows that judgmental adjustments
to model-based forecasts sometimes make the forecasts more similar to those of others, but
again this might simply be a rational response to common information not already accounted
for by the model. Bewley and Fiebig (2002) nd evidence of herding for around a half of their
sample of interest rate forecasters, but their setup does not allow for a distinction between
those who are following the packand those making use of important information contained
in the previous consensus mean that was not available to the individual forecaster at the
time(p.3).
In some cases the ndings are more nuanced than herding/anti-herding (or neither): for
example, Batchelor and Dua (1992) nd evidence of conservatism(individuals giving too
much weight to their own past forecasts) but also that too little weight is placed on the
forecasts of others.
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Table 2: Tests of herding: T1 and T2 (based on the lagged consensus)
h Proportion of regressions for which we nd:
T1 T2
2 6= 0 2 6= 0 and 2 < 0 2 6= 0 1 < 0 1 > 0 Neither
Ination
3 0.25 0.05 0.18 0.59 0.00 0.41
2 0.31 0.08 0.18 0.67 0.00 0.33
1 0.24 0.05 0.17 0.57 0.00 0.43
Output growth
3 0.29 0.01 0.13 0.59 0.00 0.41
2 0.27 0.02 0.20 0.47 0.06 0.46
1 0.20 0.04 0.15 0.34 0.06 0.60
The test regressions are:
yitjt h = 0 + 1y
i
tjt (h+1) + 2ytjt (h+2) + ut
and
yitjt h   ytjt (h+2) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+2)

+ 2ytjt (h+2) + ut;
for the left-hand-side panel, and for the right-hand-side panel:
yitjt h   yitjt (h+1) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+2)

+ ut:
The entries in the table are the proportion of regressions for which the null is rejected in
favour of the specied alternative, when the tests are applied at the 5% level.
We require 10 or more pairs of forecasts for an individual respondent. This gives around 150
regressions at each h.
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Table 3: Tests of herding: T3 (adaptation of Bernhardt et al. (2006))
h Proportion of regressions Proportion of regressions
1 < 0 1 > 0 Neither S < 0:5 S > 0:5
Ination
4 0.58 0.01 0.42 0.14 0.84
3 0.62 0.01 0.37 0.15 0.83
2 0.60 0.00 0.40 0.14 0.82
1 0.66 0.02 0.32 0.12 0.85
Output growth
4 0.58 0.02 0.40 0.18 0.80
3 0.38 0.03 0.59 0.26 0.71
2 0.30 0.03 0.68 0.21 0.78
1 0.37 0.03 0.60 0.20 0.77
The test regression is:
yt   yitjt h = 0 + 1
 
yitjt h   ytjt (h+1)

+ ut
The entries in the table are the proportion of regressions for which the null is rejected in
favour of the specied alternative, when the tests are applied at the 5% level.
The remaining two columns are the proportion of regressions for which the S-statistics is
less than / greater than one half.
We require 10 or more pairs of forecasts for an individual respondent. This gives around 150
regressions at each h.
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Table 4: Herding Tests: Summary Table for a minimum of 30 forecasts
T1 (GGJ) T2 (Forecast Revisions) T3 (BCK regression test)
h 2 6= 0 2 6= 0, 2 6= 0 1 < 0 1 > 0 Neither 1 < 0 1 > 0 Neither
2 < 0
Ination
3 0.45 0.08 0.18 0.73 0.00 0.27 0.74 0.00 0.26
2 0.39 0.09 0.19 0.66 0.00 0.34 0.74 0.00 0.26
1 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.63 0.00 0.37 0.79 0.02 0.19
Output Growth
3 0.46 0.04 0.24 0.78 0.00 0.22 0.52 0.02 0.46
2 0.40 0.00 0.21 0.53 0.04 0.43 0.37 0.00 0.63
1 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.42 0.00 0.58 0.42 0.00 0.58
The test regressions are:
GGJ test regressions
yitjt h = 0 + 1y
i
tjt (h+1) + 2ytjt (h+2) + ut
and:
yitjt h   ytjt (h+2) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+2)

+ 2ytjt (h+2) + ut:
Forecast Revision regressions
yitjt h   yitjt (h+1) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+2)

+ ut
BCK regressions
yt   yitjt h = 0 + 1
 
yitjt h   ytjt (h+1)

+ ut
The entries in the table are the proportion of regressions for which the null is rejected in
favour of the specied alternative, when the tests are applied at the 5% level.
We require 30 or more pairs of forecasts for an individual respondent. This gives 50 to 60
regressions at each h.
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Table 5: Tests of herding: T1 (adapted from Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002)). Current
Consensus
h 2 6= 0 2 6= 0 and 2 < 0 2 6= 0
Ination
4 0.44 0.05 0.16
3 0.42 0.06 0.09
2 0.46 0.06 0.11
1 0.42 0.08 0.13
Output growth
4 0.35 0.01 0.11
3 0.45 0.02 0.14
2 0.52 0.02 0.23
1 0.45 0.02 0.15
The test regressions are:
yitjt h = 0 + 1y
i
tjt (h+1) + 2ytjt (h+1) + ut
and
yitjt h   ytjt (h+1) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+1)

+ 2ytjt (h+1) + ut:
The entries in the table (columns 2 to 4) are the proportion of regressions for which the null
is rejected in favour of the specied alternative, when the tests are applied at the 5% level.
We carry out a test when there are 10 or more pairs of forecasts for an individual respondent.
This gives around 150 regressions at each h.
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Table 6: Tests of herding: T2 (based on the forecast revision). Current Consensus
h Proportion of regressions
1 < 0 1 > 0 Neither
Ination
4 0.79 0.00 0.21
3 0.75 0.00 0.25
2 0.78 0.00 0.22
1 0.74 0.01 0.26
Output growth
4 0.74 0.00 0.26
3 0.70 0.00 0.30
2 0.69 0.01 0.30
1 0.62 0.03 0.36
The test regression is:
yitjt h   yitjt (h+1) = 0 + 1
 
yitjt (h+1)   ytjt (h+1)

+ ut
The entries in the table (columns 2 to 4) are the proportion of regressions for which the null
is rejected in favour of the specied alternative, when the tests are applied at the 5% level.
We carry out a test when there are 10 or more pairs of forecasts for an individual respondent.
This gives around 150 regressions at each h.
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